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 Why is it so hard to reach the EU’s ‘poverty’ target? 
 
Zsolt Darvas  
 
Abstract 
 
The European Union’s Lisbon strategy goal of tackling poverty was a notable failure, while 
the Europe 2020 strategy’s poverty target is out of reach. Both strategies were based on 
variants of the ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator, which has an inappropriate and misleading 
name. We demonstrate theoretically and empirically by cross-section, time series and panel 
cointegration evidence, that the ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator essentially measures income 
inequality, not poverty. Our calculations show that even after taking into account the positive 
impact that expected economic growth should have on material deprivation and low work 
intensity, the Gini coefficient of income inequality would have to fall by 3.5 points in each EU 
country if the Europe 2020 poverty target is to be reached, which is implausible. Huge 
differences between national poverty thresholds make the EU-wide poverty aggregate 
pointless. We approximate the EU-wide distribution of income and use it calculate EU-wide 
poverty indicators. The political agreement between EU member states expressed the goal of 
reducing poverty, not inequality. There are good reasons to aim for lower income inequality, 
but a political agreement would be needed to set an inequality goal and corresponding 
policies. 
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Miért ilyen nehéz az Európa 2020 stratégia szegénység-
csökkentési célkitűzésének elérése? 
 
Zsolt Darvas 
 
Kivonat 
 
Az Európai Unió lisszaboni stratégiájának szegénységcsökkentési célja súlyos kudarcot 
vallott, és az Európa 2020 stratégia szegénységi célkitűzése nem látszik elérhetőnek. Mindkét 
stratégia a „szegénységnek kitett” mutató változatain alapul, melynek helytelen és félrevezető 
neve van. Elméletileg és empirikusan demonstráljuk keresztmetszeti, idősoros és 
panelkointegrációs eredmények alapján, hogy a szegénységnek kitett mutató alapvetően a 
jövedelemegyenlőtlenséget, nem pedig a szegénységet méri. Számításaink azt mutatják, hogy 
figyelembe véve a várható gazdasági növekedésnek az anyagi nélkülözésre és az alacsony 
munkaintenzitásra gyakorolt pozitív hatását, a Gini jövedelemegyenlőtlenségi együtthatónak 
minden egyes EU-országban 3,5 ponttal kellene csökkennie az Európa 2020 szegénységi 
célkitűzés eléréséhez, ami valószínűtlen. A nemzeti szegénységi küszöbök közötti hatalmas 
különbségek az EU egészére vonatkozó szegénységnek kitett mutatót értelmetlenné teszik. 
Megbecsüljük az uniós szintű jövedelemelosztást, amely segítségével az EU egészére kiterjedő 
szegénységi mutatókat számolunk. Az EU tagállamok közötti politikai megállapodás a 
szegénység csökkentésére vonatkozott, nem pedig a jövedelemegyenlőtlenségek 
csökkentésére. Bár felhozhatóak indokok az alacsonyabb jövedelmi egyenlőtlenségre való 
törekvés mellett, de politikai egyetértésre lenne szükség az egyenlőtlenségi cél és az ennek 
megfelelő gazdasági és szociális politikák meghatározásához. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: Európa 2020, EU-szintű jövedelemeloszlás, jövedelemegyenlőtlenség, 
szegénységmérés 
 
JEL: D31, E37, I32 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union’s social dimension, in particular the fight against poverty, has received 
increasing attention in recent decades. The EU’s Lisbon Strategy, adopted in 2000, aimed to 
make a decisive impact in terms of the eradication of poverty (European Council, 2000). A 
decade later, ‘Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ was 
adopted in 2010 as the EU’s landmark economic and social policy strategy. It formulated EU-
wide numerical targets for employment, research and development, climate/energy, 
education and poverty reduction/social inclusion. The ‘poverty’ target set by the European 
Commission (2010) aims to lift “over 20 million people out of poverty” between 2008 and 
2020 in the EU271. 
Progress to date towards these targets has been disappointing. Rather than declining, the 
number of people classified as ‘at risk of poverty’ increased by 7.2 million overall from 2000-
10 in the first 15 members of the EU, highlighting the failure to meet the Lisbon Strategy 
goal2. The Europe 2020 target looks similarly out of reach: in the first 27 EU member states, 
the number of people ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ increased overall by 6.3 million 
from 2008-12, after which it fell by 4.7 million from 2012-15, leading to a figure in 2015 that 
was still above the 2008 value by about 1.6 million people. The EU’s apparent failure to 
reduce ‘poverty’ has received great attention, with calls for more effective measures from 
many quarters, including the European Commission, European Parliament, trade unions and 
civil society organisations. 
In this paper we demonstrate that the Lisbon Strategy’s key ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator 
and the Europe 2020 ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ indicator have inappropriate and 
very misleading names. While according to Atkinson, Marlier and Nolan (2004), the task 
force that helped to develop the social indicators highlighted that the ‘at risk of poverty’ 
indicator does not provide a basis for assessing people as ‘poor’, the European Commission 
and the Council subsequently agreed to label the indicator as ‘at risk of poverty’. Poverty has 
many different definitions, as summarised by, for example, Coudouel, Hentschel and Wodon 
(2002), Marx, Nolan and Olivera (2015) and Weziak-Bialowolska (2016). However, a 
standard definition of poverty, which coincides with the everyday use of the word ‘poverty’, 
refers to a situation in which the individual has little money and few possessions. The ‘at risk 
of poverty’ indicator is used in such a context in dozens of documents from EU institutions 
and in the speeches of the representatives of those institutions. But we have not been able to 
                                                        
1 The first 27 European Union members, predating Croatian membership. 
2 The increase from 2000-07 was 6.4 million and therefore the global financial and economic crisis, 
which intensified in 2008, was not a major reason for this failure. 
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find any EU document or speech by an EU representative that highlighted that the ‘at risk of 
poverty’ indicator essentially measures the same phenomenon as the Gini coefficient of 
income inequality. 
We demonstrate the clear theoretical and strong empirical association between the ‘at 
risk of poverty’ indicator and the Gini coefficient of income inequality. We establish a 
deterministic mathematical relationship between the two variables when the income 
distribution is assumed to be described by the log-normal distribution, which is frequently 
found to be a reasonable description of actual income distributions. We then present cross-
section, time-series and panel cointegration evidence showing a very strong empirical 
association between the two variables. Since income inequality has increased within many 
EU countries during the past decades, it is not surprising at all that the ‘poverty’ goal of the 
Lisbon strategy has been badly missed and there was no progress towards the Europe 2020 
goal between 2008 and 2015.  
Given the strong association between the two variables, we illustratively calculate that 
even after taking into account the positive impact expected economic growth should have on 
material deprivation and low work intensity (the other two components of the Europe 2020 
‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ indicator), the Gini coefficient of income inequality 
would have to fall by 3.5 Gini points in each EU country if the Europe 2020 ‘poverty’ target is 
to be reached. This would be a huge decline relative to historical variations in the Gini 
coefficient. Given the lack of strong policies to reduce income inequality, it is extremely 
unlikely that the Europe 2020 ‘poverty’ target will be met. 
We also argue that the enormous differences between ‘poverty’ thresholds adopted by 
different EU countries make the EU-wide poverty aggregate pointless. We therefore 
approximate the EU-wide distribution of income and calculate EU-wide poverty indicators 
from this EU-wide distribution. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the ‘poverty’ indicator 
of the Europe 2020 strategy in a historical context. Section 3 demonstrates the clear 
theoretical and the strong empirical association between the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate and the 
Gini coefficient of income inequality. Section 4 estimates regression models to project the 
expected change in material deprivation and low work intensity of those people who are not 
‘at risk of poverty’. Based on these projections, this section illustratively calculates the 
necessary reduction in the Gini coefficient of income inequality to meet the Europe 2020 
‘poverty’ target. Section 5 discusses the problem with the aggregation of national ‘at risk of 
poverty’ indicators to EU level, and derives poverty indicators from the EU-wide distribution 
of income. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks and makes proposals for better 
measurement of poverty in the EU.  
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2. THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY POVERTY INDICATOR 
2.1. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS 
There is a long-standing literature on social indicators, which have been used in various ways 
by the European Union and the preceding European Communities. Atkinson et al (2002) 
provide a comprehensive overview of the various indicators. The Lisbon Strategy, adopted in 
March 2000 by the EU heads of state and government, aimed to make Europe "the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion" (European 
Council, 2000). European Council (2000) also expressed the aim that “steps must be taken 
to make a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty” (European Council, 2000). 
This Lisbon strategy included six specific indicators for social cohesion, in addition to 
various indicators of employment, innovation and research, economic reform and general 
economic background indicators. A key social cohesion indicator was the ‘poverty rate’, which 
measured the share of the population below the poverty line. This poverty lines was generally 
defined as 60 percent of the median equivalised disposable income3 in each country 
(European Commission, 2000). While the EU’s Task Force on Poverty and Social Exclusion 
expressed concerns that income below 60 percent of the median income should not be taken 
as a basis for assessing people as ‘poor’, the European Commission and the Council 
subsequently agreed to label the indicator as ‘persons at risk of poverty’ (Atkinson, Marlier 
and Nolan, 2004). 
2.2 THE EU2020 INDICATOR: AT RISK OF POVERTY OR SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
In its March 2010 publication of the Europe 2020 strategy, European Commission (2010) 
proposed that the same ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator should be used. In 2008 there were 
slightly more than 80 million people deemed ‘at risk of poverty’ in the then 27-member EU, 
and the Commission proposed to set the target in terms of this baseline: “the number of 
Europeans living below the national poverty lines should be reduced by 25%, lifting over 20 
                                                        
3 The equivalised disposable income is the total income of a household, after tax and other 
deductions, that is available for spending or saving, divided by the number of household members 
converted into equalised adults; household members are equalised or made equivalent by weighting 
each according to their age, using the so-called modified OECD equivalence scale. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Glossary:Equivalised_disposable_income.  
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million people out of poverty”, where “the national poverty line is defined as 60% of the 
median disposable income in each Member State.” 
However, in subsequent negotiations, the indicator was found to be too narrow. The final 
indicator adopted by the European Council (2010) was the ‘at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion’ indicator, which is the combination of three indicators. It includes the total 
number of people that fall into one or more of three categories:  
 ‘At risk of poverty’: people with a disposable income below 60 percent of the national 
median equivalised disposable income; 
 ‘Severely materially deprived’: people unable to afford at least four of the following: 1. 
rent, mortgage or utility bills, 2. adequate home heating, 3. a reserve against 
unexpected expenses, 4. regular meat or proteins, 5. a holiday, 6. a television set, 7. a 
washing machine, 8 a car, 9. a telephone; 
 ‘Living in a household with a very low work intensity’: total number of months that all 
working-age household members have worked relative to the total number of months 
the same household members theoretically could have worked is below 20 percent. 
The measurement of all three subcomponents is based on the European Union statistics 
on income and living conditions (EU-SILC), which is an annual household survey4. 
Figure 1 breaks down this indicator according to its components in 2015, when there were 
117.6 million people in the EU27 who were deemed to be ‘at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion’. Since a person can belong to one, two or all three of its components, the 
overlapping areas of the circles indicate the people who belong to more than one of the 
components.  
 
                                                        
4 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-statistics-on-income-and-living-
conditions  
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Figure 1 
People ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ in the EU27 in 2015 (millions) 
 
Source: prepared on the basis of the figure on page 26 of the Annex of 
European Commission (2014) using data from the Eurostat dataset 
‘Intersections of Europe 2020 Poverty Target Indicators by age and 
sex [ilc_pees01]’. 
Note: the overlapping areas of the circles indicate the people who 
belong to more than one of the components. For example, there were 
9.0 million people who belonged to all three components. The sum of 
the seven numbers indicated is 117.6 million, the total number of 
people in the EU27 who were deemed to be ‘at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion’ in 2015. 
 
In 2008, there were 115.9 million people in the EU27 ‘at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion’ according to these measures, which is 23.7% of population. The European Council 
retained the 20 million reduction target for this indicator and therefore the target for 2020 
was set at about 96 million. 
It is notable that while the European Council adopted the EU-wide 20 million person 
target, it did not share out this target among member states, but allowed them to set their 
own targets. The sum of member states’ targets is a reduction of about 12 million people, 
highlighting a major discrepancy between the EU-wide target and national commitments5. 
                                                        
5 Furthermore, European Council (2010) allowed member states “to set their national targets on the 
basis of the most appropriate indicators, taking into account their national circumstances”. Nine 
countries adopted a different indicator: Bulgaria: at risk of poverty; Germany: long-term 
unemployed; Denmark: persons living in households with low work intensity; Estonia: at risk of 
poverty; Ireland: combined poverty, defined as those severe materially deprived who are also at risk 
of poverty; Latvia: at risk of poverty and/or living in households with very low work intensity; 
Netherlands: people aged 0-64 living in a jobless household; Sweden: percent of women and men 
aged 20-64 who are not in the labour force (except full-time students), the long-term unemployed or 
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Progress to date has been disappointing. Instead of a decline, the number of people in the 
EU27 deemed at risk of poverty or social exclusion increased from 115.9 million to 122.2 
million in 2012 and then declined to 117.5 million, still above the 2008 value and very far 
from the target of 96 million.  
We highlight that the aim agreed by the European Council was “promoting social 
inclusion in particular through the reduction of poverty” and income inequality was not 
mentioned in the European Council conclusions that adopted the Europe 2020 strategy (see 
European Council, 2010).  
2.3 THE DEFINITIONS OF POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
There is an extremely voluminous body of academic and policy research on poverty, 
inequality and social exclusion; see for example overviews in Coudouel, Hentschel and 
Wodon (2002) and Marx, Nolan and Olivera (2015). These concepts are defined in many 
different ways.  
A standard definition of poverty is whether “households or individuals have sufficient 
resources or abilities to meet their daily needs”, as argued by the World Bank6. This 
definition is in line with the everyday use of the word poverty7. In his Noble lecture, Deaton 
(2016) also uses the word poverty in such a context. This definition is sometimes considered 
as an absolute measure of poverty. Poverty has non-monetary aspects, such as health, 
education and subjective perceptions and is frequently measured by a multidimensional 
approach (Alkire and Santos, 2013; Weziak-Bialowolska, 2014). 
Relative poverty is usually defined as having little in terms of a specific aspect (like 
income, wealth, health, or education) compared to other members of society. The way 
individuals perceive their position relative to other people can be an important aspect of their 
welfare.  
Inequality refers to the extent to which a specific aspect (like income) is distributed 
unevenly among the population. Similarly to the concept of relative poverty, in unequal 
societies poorer individuals might perceive that they have fewer means than richer 
                                                                                                                                                                             
those on long-term sick leave; United Kingdom: numerical targets from the 2010 Child Poverty Act 
and Child Poverty Strategy 2011-14, which are in turn different versions of the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate 
(source: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/targets_en.pdf and the accompanying national 
documents). None of these nine countries made their choice on the basis of the near equivalence of 
the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate and the Gini coefficient of income inequality that we demonstrate in our 
paper and in fact five of the nine countries adopted a version of the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate. 
6 See for example the World Bank’s ’Measuring Poverty’ page: 
http://go.worldbank.org/0C60K5UK40.  
7 The Cambridge Dictionary (http://dictionary.cambridge.org) defines poverty as “the condition of 
being extremely poor,” and poor as “having little money and/or few possessions”.  
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individuals, which might affect their life satisfaction irrespective of their actual living 
standards. 
A reasonable definition of social exclusion is “a process whereby certain individuals are 
pushed to the edge of society and prevented from participating fully by virtue of their 
poverty, or lack of basic competencies and lifelong learning opportunities, or as a result of 
discrimination. This distances them from job, income and education opportunities as well 
as social and community networks and activities. They have little access to power and 
decision-making bodies and thus often feeling powerless and unable to take control over the 
decisions that affect their day to day lives.” (The Council of the European Union, 2004). The 
Commission of European Communities (1992) explained the difficulties in measuring social 
exclusion, which has different manifestations, such as homeless people on the streets, the 
marginalisation of the very long-term unemployed, persistent poverty in certain rural areas, 
and the rejection of refugees and minorities.  
The definitions offered above underline that there are many overlaps between these 
concepts: 
 Poverty might lead to social exclusion.  
 For a given level of average income in a country, higher income inequality implies 
more poverty: consider two countries with the same average income but with different 
levels of income inequality; in the country with a higher inequality level there will be 
more poor (and also more rich) than in the country with a lower level of income 
inequality.  
 Thereby, more inequality might also lead to more social exclusion.  
 Relative income poverty is a very similar concept to income inequality. When income 
inequality is high, the gap between the incomes of people at the top and the bottom of 
the income distribution is wide and thus relative income poverty is high. A possible 
conceptual difference between relative income poverty and income inequality is that 
the former focuses on the lower part of the income distribution, while the latter 
considers the entire population. 
Furthermore, a common factor might influence all indicators simultaneously. For 
example, unemployment, and especially long-term unemployment, might lead to more 
poverty, relative poverty, inequality and social exclusion. 
The fact that poverty, relative poverty, inequality and social exclusion have many 
different definitions, and that there are various overlaps between these concepts, necessitates 
careful use of the various indicators developed to measure these concepts. 
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The focus of this paper is on the ‘at risk of poverty’ component of the Europe 2020 ‘at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion’ target indicator and we will analyse in the next session what it 
actually measures. Concerning the other two components of the Europe 2020 target 
indicator, we highlight that their names are clear and their interpretations are 
straightforward: 
 ‘Living in a household with a very low work intensity’ correctly describes that 
working-age members of the household work little. People living in such households 
might face a significant risk of exclusion from the labour market, potentially leading 
to social exclusion too. 
 ‘Severely materially deprived’ unmistakeably indicates that people belonging to this 
category might lack sufficient resources to meet their needs. Thanks to Europe’s 
generally high living standards and extensive welfare states, there are hardly any 
people below the standard poverty thresholds that are used globally. That means 
there are very few people in the EU living on less than $1.25 or $2 a day. The severe 
material deprivation rate is therefore a relevant indicator of poverty in the European 
context. It might also reflect social exclusion if poor people face difficulties in terms of 
social integration.  
However, we note that it is surprising to find 18.7 million people in the EU27 (who reside 
in both ‘high wage’ and ‘low wage’ countries) who were severally materially deprived in 2015, 
but had income higher than 60 percent of the national median equivalised income (see the 
part of the dashed-line circle which is outside the solid-line circle in Figure 1). We would have 
expected severe material deprivation for people with very low incomes, yet there are 64.8 
million people below 60 percent of the national median equivalised income who are not 
severely materially deprived (the part of the solid-line circle which is outside the dashed-line 
circle in Figure 1). This highlights that the material deprivation indicator measures 
perceptions, and we cannot exclude the hypothesis that this indicator carries large 
measurement errors. 
3. THE ‘AT RISK OF POVERTY’ INDICATOR ESSENTIALLY MEASURES 
INCOME INEQUALITY 
The ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator dominates the Europe 2020 overall indicator of ‘at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion’: 73 percent of people ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ in the 
EU27 were flagged up by the criterion ‘at risk of poverty’ in 2015 (Figure 1). We argue that 
this indicator has a very misleading name and we show that it essentially measures income 
inequality.  
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One issue is the interpretation of ‘risk’ in the name of the indicator. In principle, everyone 
can be considered to be at risk; even a billionaire faces the risk of losing her/his wealth. The 
question is the degree of riskiness. The ‘at risk’ part of the indicator should refer to a 
significant degree of risk. 
Someone with income below 60 percent of national median income is not necessarily at 
high risk of poverty. Even Eurostat’s glossary highlights that: “this indicator does not 
measure wealth or poverty, but low income in comparison to other residents in that 
country, which does not necessarily imply a low standard of living”8. That is, Eurostat uses 
the word ‘poverty’ in the common sense of someone being poor and underlines that the ‘at 
risk of poverty’ indicator does not measure poverty.  
For example in a rich country like Luxembourg, the bulk of the people below the 60 
percent of the Luxembourgish median income have much higher living standards than, for 
example, a citizen in Romania earning the average Romanian income, who is in turn in a 
much better position than someone with an average income in Africa. 
3.1 THEORETICAL ASSOCIATION 
Conceptually, the definition of the ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator and the explanation provided 
in the Eurostat glossary resemble an indicator of income inequality. In more equal societies, 
more people have incomes closer to the median income and consequently the share of people 
with income below 60 percent of the median income is low. In the extreme case of a country 
with perfect income equality, everyone earns the same and therefore nobody is below (and 
nobody is above) the median income. In a country with some level of income inequality, there 
are (by definition) people with incomes both below and above the median income, but when 
income inequality is very low, nobody may have an income below 60 percent of the median 
income. Therefore, in a country with a rather equal income distribution, the ‘at risk of 
poverty’ indicator could take the value of zero, even if everyone was extremely poor.  
In contrast, in more unequal societies there are greater income differences and therefore 
more people below 60 percent of median income.  
A deterministic mathematical relationship can be established between the Gini coefficient 
of income inequality and the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate if income distribution is assumed to be 
described by a certain statistical distribution function. We use the log-normal distribution, 
which is frequently found to be effective in describing income distributions (Lubrano, 2015; 
Darvas, 2016). A random variable has a log-normal distribution if its logarithm has a normal 
                                                        
8 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:At-risk-of-poverty_rate.  
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distribution. The key functions and parameters of the log-normal distribution are included in 
Table 1.  
In our calculations, we set the mean at an arbitrary level; the theoretical relationship 
between the Gini coefficient of income inequality and the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate is 
independent from the value of the mean. For a particular Gini coefficient in the range of 
[0,50], we calculate parameter s using the expression in Table 1. The function for the mean 
allows the calculation of parameter m, which in turn allows the calculation of the median. We 
then evaluate the cumulative distribution function at 60 percent of the median. 
Table 1 
Key functions and parameters of the log-normal distribution 
Probability density function 
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Source: Lubrano (2015) and http://mathworld.wolfram.com/.  
Note:  .  in expression for the cumulative distribution function and Gini coefficient is the 
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. 
 
Figure 2 shows the theoretical association between the two indicators when income 
distribution is described by the log-normal distribution. In this case, practically nobody is 
deemed to be ‘at risk of poverty’ (that is, nobody has income below 60 percent of the median) 
when the Gini coefficient of income inequality is low. For example, when the Gini coefficient 
is 7, 8, and 9, then the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate is 0.002 percent, 0.016 percent and 0.070 
percent, respectively. The ‘at risk of poverty’ rate becomes 1 percent when the Gini coefficient 
is 12.3. At higher levels of income inequality the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate increases in line with 
the increase in the Gini coefficient. 
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While the theoretical association between the two indicators is slightly non-linear when 
the Gini coefficient is larger than 12, it can be well approximated by a linear relationship 
when the Gini coefficient of disposable income inequality is in the range observed in EU 
countries, that is, in the range of 23-36. In this range, a linear approximation suggests that a 1 
point increase in the Gini coefficient is associated with a 0.86 point increase in the ‘at risk of 
poverty’ rate. 
Figure 2 
 The theoretical association between the Gini coefficient of income inequality 
and the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate when income distribution is log-normal 
 
Source: Author calculations. Note: the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate is 
defined as the share of people with income below 60 percent of the 
national medium income.  
 
In reality, actual income distributions differ from parametrised statistical distributions 
and therefore the association between the two indicators is not deterministic. Moreover, the 
‘at risk of poverty’ rate considers only the bottom part of the income distribution, while the 
whole distribution matters for the Gini coefficient. Different Gini coefficients might therefore 
correspond to the same ‘at risk of poverty’ rate and a particular Gini coefficient might 
correspond to different ‘at risk of poverty’ rates, as also noted by Marx, Nolan and Olivera 
(2015). We therefore also look at the association revealed by data. 
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3.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Figure 3 highlights that the empirical cross-section association between the ‘at risk of 
poverty’ rate and the Gini-coefficient of income inequality across European countries is 
indeed not deterministic, but there is a very strong empirical association between them9. 
Using average values from 2008 to 2015, the correlation coefficient between the two 
indicators is 0.91, which is a very high value. The correlation in yearly data is similarly high in 
the range between 0.86 and 0.92. A simple cross-section linear regression suggests that a 1 
point increase in the Gini coefficient is associated with a 0.92 point increase in the ‘at risk of 
poverty’ rate – a result very similar to what we obtained when analysing the theoretical 
association between the two indicators using the log-normal distribution. 
Figure 3 
The empirical association between the Gini coefficient of income inequality  
and the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate 
 
Source: Updated from Darvas and Tschekassin (2015) using data from 
Eurostat. Note: both indicators are averaged over 2007-15. The at risk of 
                                                        
9 Figure 1 in Marx, Nolan and Olivera (2015) is a similar chart for OECD countries. 
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poverty indicators is ‘At risk of poverty rate (cut-off point: 60 percent of 
median equivalised income after social transfers)’, while the Gini coefficient 
is the ‘Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income’. 
 
The evolution of the indicators for each country also highlights the strong co-movement 
of the two indicators. Figure 4 shows that the Gini coefficient of income inequality and the ‘at 
risk of poverty’ rate moved in tandem in a number of countries. In contrast, the severe 
material deprivation rate (a useful available measure of poverty in the European context) 
developed in strikingly different ways in these countries, highlighting again that the ‘at risk of 
poverty’ rate is rather distinct from poverty developments.  
In order to test the co-movement of the Gini coefficient of income inequality and the ‘at 
risk of poverty’ rate, we adopt the panel cointegration tests. In the long-run, none of the two 
variables can follow an integrated process, because both variables are bounded between zero 
and one (or zero 100 if measured in percent or multiplied by 100). However, in finite sample 
these variables could be approximated by an integrated process. Since our sample period is 
rather short, we assess cointegration in a panel framework in order to increase the sample 
size. 
As an initial step, we test the order of integration using a standard augmented Dickey-
Fuller test for each country separately. We find that among the 30 countries considered10, 
there are 22 countries for which the null hypothesis of unit root in both the Gini coefficient of 
income inequality and in the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate cannot be rejected. The results of panel 
unit root and stationarity tests applied to the pooled times series of these 22 countries 
confirm these conclusions (Table 2). 
 
                                                        
10 The 30 countries considered include the first 27 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland, three countries for which Eurostat publishes the two indicators, using the same 
methodology as for EU countries.  
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Figure 4 
The Gini coefficient of income inequality, the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate and the 
severe material deprivation rate in selected countries, 2003-15 
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Source: Eurostat’s ‘Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income - EU-SILC 
survey [ilc_di12]’, ‘At-risk-of-poverty rate by poverty threshold, age and sex - EU-
SILC survey [ilc_li02]’ and ‘Severe material deprivation rate by age and sex 
[ilc_mddd11]’ databases. 
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Table 2 
 Panel unit root and stationarity tests 
 
Gini coefficient of 
income inequality 
‘At risk of poverty’ 
rate 
Null hypothesis and method Statistic Probability Statistic Probability 
     Null hypothesis: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)    
Levin, Lin & Chu t 0.60 0.727 -0.66 0.255 
     Null hypothesis: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)    
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  0.24 0.594 0.15 0.558 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 43.05 0.512 41.67 0.572 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 42.79 0.524 40.57 0.620 
     Null hypothesis: Stationarity          
Hadri Z-stat 6.80 0.000 9.05 0.000 
Heteroscedastic consistent Z-stat 6.46 0.000 7.70 0.000 
Source: author calculations.  
Note: the sample includes annual data for 22 countries between 1995-2016, with several 
gaps in the data.  
 
For the panel of 22 countries for which both the Gini coefficient of income inequality and 
the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate are found to be non-stationary, we test for cointegration using the 
various test statistics developed by Pedroni (2004). These tests are among the most 
frequently used panel cointegration tests. The various test statistics allow for heterogeneous 
dynamics and heterogeneous slope coefficients. Each of these tests is able to accommodate 
individual specific short-run dynamics, individual specific fixed effects and deterministic 
trends, as well as individual specific slope coefficients. 
We use the version of the test which allows an intercept, but not a deterministic trend in 
the cointegrating vector. We exclude the deterministic trend due to the nature of our data, 
which in theory cannot include a deterministic trend component. 
The results of the tests are reported in Table 3. All four versions of the test soundly reject 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration when the alternative hypothesis is common 
autoregressive coefficients. When the alternative hypothesis is individual autoregressive 
coefficients, two of the three possible test statistics reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration. Overall, Pedroni (2004) cointegration tests strongly support the hypothesis 
that the Gini coefficient of income inequality and the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate are tied together. 
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Table 3 
 Pedroni (2004) panel cointegration tests between the Gini coefficient  
of income inequality and the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate 
Null Hypothesis: No 
cointegration   
Alternative hypothesis: common autoregressive 
coefficients (within-dimension) 
 
Statistic Probability 
Panel v-Statistic 2.35 0.009 
Panel rho-Statistic -1.77 0.038 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.76 0.003 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.13 0.001 
   Alternative hypothesis: individual 
autoregressive coefficients (between-
dimension) 
 
Statistic Probability 
Group rho-Statistic -0.60 0.276 
Group PP-Statistic -3.75 0.000 
Group ADF-Statistic -5.15 0.000 
Source: author calculations.  
Note: the sample includes annual data for 22 countries 
between 1995-2016, with several gaps in the data.  
 
Based on the theoretical and the empirical evidence presented above we conclude that the 
‘at risk of poverty’ rate essentially measures the same phenomenon as the Gini coefficient of 
income inequality.  
3.3 THE USE OF THE ‘AT RISK OF POVERTY’ INDICATOR IN EU POLICY DISCUSSIONS 
In EU policy circles, the ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator is used inappropriately. It is typically 
used as an indicator measuring absolute poverty. The expression ‘poverty reduction’ is very 
often referred to in connection with this indicator, but we did not find any indication in EU 
policy documents when the clear theoretical and robust empirical associations between the 
Gini coefficient of income inequality and the ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator are mentioned. 
Some examples: 
 When the European Commission set the target of “lifting over 20 million people out 
of poverty” in March 2010, using the ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator, it did not include 
any reference to income inequality. The European Commission’s Social Protection & 
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Social Inclusion website11 continues to state that “the Europe 2020 strategy for 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth sets targets to lift at least 20 million people 
out of poverty and social exclusion”, without defining poverty or highlighting the 
near equivalence of the poverty indicator and the Gini coefficient of income 
inequality. 
 
 The European Parliament, meanwhile, adopted a resolution of 25 November 2014 on 
employment and social aspects of the Europe 2020 strategy, which stated that “the 
EU is far from having achieved the employment and poverty reduction headline 
targets of the Europe 2020 strategy”, argued that “particular attention should be 
paid to poverty reduction” and used the term “poverty reduction” several dozen 
times throughout the resolution, based on information derived from the ‘at risk of 
poverty’ rate, without highlighting that it measures the same phenomenon as the Gini 
coefficient of income inequality (European Parliament, 2014)12.  
 
 The European Confederation of Workers’ Cooperatives, Social Cooperatives and 
Social and Participative Enterprises (CECOP – CICOPA Europe), which represents 
national organisations in 17 countries, expressed its position on the Europe 2020 
Strategy Mid-Term Review by stating that “instead of progress in poverty alleviation 
as planned, a further 6.6 million people have actually fallen into poverty in the last 4 
years”. Similarly, the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN), the largest platform of 
anti-poverty organisations in Europe, talked about “the unacceptable levels of 
poverty and social exclusion in the EU faced by 1 in 4 of the population” and called 
for “delivery on Europe 2020 goals, particularly the poverty target”, in a letter sent 
to European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker about the Commission’s 
2017 Annual Growth Survey.  
Many similar examples could be listed from reports of European institutions, trade 
unions and civil society organisations, as well as from the speeches of key representatives of 
these institutions and organisations. 
At minimum, the extremely misleading indicator label ‘at risk of poverty’ should be 
replaced with ‘relative income poverty or income inequality’, to dispel any doubts about the 
                                                        
11 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=750&langId=en, accessed on 27 April 2017. 
12 We note that European Parliament (2014) also called for better measurement: “43. Calls, 
therefore, for objective indicators of ‘poverty’ to be used for the measurement of Member States’ 
poverty rates so as to help identify those at risk of exclusion; 44. Recalls, however, that a poverty 
indicator provides no direct evidence of the experience of social exclusion, and therefore calls for 
improved measurement of perceived social exclusion in order to reach a better understanding of 
the reasons for social exclusion and of which groups are particularly affected”. 
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correct interpretation of this indicator. Similarly, the name of the Europe 2020 target 
indicator ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ should be replaced with ‘relative income 
poverty or income inequality or potentially social excluded’, which may sound convoluted, 
but would be better than then the current short but misleading name. A better solution would 
be to scrap the Europe 2020 target indicator and to design a new one, which might refer to 
either absolute poverty or relative poverty and income inequality, depending on political 
choices.  
4. HOW TO MEET THE EUROPE 2020 ‘POVERTY’ TARGET?  
4.1 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
In its stock-taking report, the European Commission (2014) concluded that the recent 
economic crisis was primarily responsible for the divergence of the ‘at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion’ indicator from its target. While it is sadly true that the crisis increased 
unemployment and (absolute) poverty, a more fundamental reason for the dismal 
performance is that the indicator used is more an indicator of income inequality than an 
indicator of poverty. 
In order to assess the social developments needed to reach the Europe 2020 ‘poverty’ 
target, we split the indicator into two parts:  
(1) All people considered ‘at risk of poverty’ by the respective indicator, that is, people 
with incomes below 60 percent of the national equivalised median income, 
irrespective of whether or not these people are also materially deprived, or whether 
they live in households with low work intensity;  
(2) People not ‘at risk of poverty’, who are severely materially deprived and/or live in 
households with low work intensity, but have income above the 60 percent of the 
median of the national equivalised income. 
Table 4 shows that the ‘not at risk of poverty’ component increased significantly in the EU 
from 2008-12, from 35.0 million to 39.1 million, a development in which the economic and 
financial crisis which intensified after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
likely played a role. However, with the gradual return of economic growth to Europe, this 
component declined from 39.1 million in 2012 to 31.9 million in 2015, well below its 2008 
value.  
In contrast, the at-risk-of-poverty component, which as we have argued is an indicator of 
income inequality, increased both from 2008-12 and from 2012-15, meaning that this 
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component increased even during the period of economic recovery, in line with the increase 
in income inequality within many EU countries.  
Table 4 
 The ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ indicator: actual developments in 
2008-2015 and our illustrative scenario to meet the Europe 2020 target (EU27, 
million people) 
 
2008 2012 2015 2020 
At risk of poverty or social exclusion 115.9 122.2 117.6 95.9 
of which: 
       At risk of poverty 80.9 83.1 85.8 70.2 
   Not at risk of poverty 35.0 39.1 31.9 25.7 
Source: Eurostat for 2008-15, author calculations for 2020. 
 
Our hypotheses are that the non-at-risk-of poverty component is expected to be reduced 
when: 
 Average income is higher: in higher income countries even the poorer segments of the 
society are typically better off than the poorer people in lower income countries and 
thereby the share of severally materially deprived people is typically low in higher 
income countries. 
 Negative output gaps close: when the economy is below potential, unemployment is 
higher than normal, which directly influences the spectre of living in households with 
low work intensity, while lower income due to weak economic conditions and 
unemployment increases material deprivation. With the closing of the negative 
output gap, these disadvantages disappear. 
Furthermore, economic growth used to lead to a higher average income and an upward 
movement of the output gap. Growth typically creates jobs and thereby the unemployed have 
a better chance of finding work. Even if income inequality widens with growth, the poorer 
segments of the society may receive a higher income and thereby material deprivation can be 
reduced. Even though economic growth might influence both the level of income and the 
output gap, it is worthwhile to assess the relevance of both indicators.  
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In order to test these hypotheses, we estimate regressions, both in a panel framework 
involving the first 27 EU member states and in a single equation framework for each member 
states separately. Our econometric analysis strongly confirms the hypotheses.  
We use two functional forms: a linear form and a log-linear form. The panel versions of 
these two forms are the following: 
 
 
where  is the difference between ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ rate and the ‘at 
risk of poverty’ rate (both expressed as a percent of population) of country i in time t,  is the 
general intercept,  is the country-specific fixed effect,  is time-specific fixed effect,  
is mean income in country i in time t (expressed in constant-price purchasing power 
standards),  is the output gap country i in time t (expressed as a percent of potential 
output),  are parameters to be estimated, and  is the error term. Our data sources 
are listed in the Annex. 
The log-linear version ensures that the fitted and forecast values are always positive, as 
they should be. 
Table 5 shows that in our panel regressions estimates, the parameters of both mean 
income and the output gap are statistically significant with the correct sign in almost every 
specification, irrespective of (i) the use country and time fixed effects, (ii) whether the lagged 
dependent variable is included or not13, (iii) whether the untransformed variables are used or 
a logarithmic transformation is applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 Mean income is not significant when lagged dependent variable is included and fixed effects are 
not included. It is significant in all other specifications.  
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Table 5 
 Panel regression results for the ‘not at risk of poverty’ component of the ‘at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion’ rate 
 
Linear version Log-linear version 
  
Model 
A 
Model 
B 
Model 
C 
Model 
D 
Model 
E 
Model 
F 
Model 
G 
Model 
H 
Mean income -0.56 -0.02 -0.95 -0.21 -0.90 0.00 -1.36 -0.42 
[t-ratio] [-11.1] [-0.9] [-7.4] [-2.7] 
[-
19.6] [0.1] [-13.3] [-3.2] 
Output gap -0.10 -0.20 -0.12 -0.21 -0.017 -0.021 -0.012 -0.022 
[t-ratio] [-1.4] [-8.2] [-2.1] [-6.1] [-2.4] [-8.6] [-2.6] [-6.0] 
Lagged noaorp rate   0.85 
 
0.62   0.94 
 
0.67 
[t-ratio]   [17.6] 
 
[7.7]   [33.2] 
 
[14.1] 
R-squared 0.43 0.93 0.87 0.95 0.55 0.94 0.90 0.96 
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Years 13 12 13 12 13 12 13 12 
Observations 313 286 313 286 313 286 313 286 
Fixed effects no no yes yes no no yes yes 
Source: Author calculations. Note: the dependent variable is the difference between ‘at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion’ rate and the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate, both expressed as a percent of 
population. Mean income is measured in constant price purchasing power standards, while the 
output gap is measured as percent of potential output. For better readability of the table, we multiply 
the estimated parameter of mean income by one thousand in the linear version.  
 
The country-specific regressions also largely confirm both hypotheses. There are only six 
countries, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden, for which none of the 
two variables are statistically significant. For the other 21 countries one or both of the 
variables are statistically significant.  
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4.2 PROJECTIONS FOR 2016-2020 
Using our estimated models, we project how much reduction is expected in the ‘not at risk of 
poverty’ component by 2020. For all but three countries14, 2015 is the latest year for which 
the necessary EU-SILC related data (mean income, ‘at risk of poverty’ rate, ‘at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion’ rate, Gini coefficient of income inequality) are available. We use the 
forecasts of the European Commission (which are available for 2016-18) and IMF (which are 
also available for 2019-20) to project the non-at-risk-of-poverty component. 
For our projections, we use the country-specific regression to allow for different 
sensitivity of social indicators to economic developments. For these projections, we use the 
version of the model which is estimated on logarithmic values (to ensure that projections are 
always positive), include the lagged dependent variable, and include only those explanatory 
variables which were statistically significant. Therefore, for the six countries for which 
neither mean income, nor the output gap was significant, we use a simple first order 
autoregressive model. 
For our projections, we make the following assumptions: 
 Mean income growth rate in constant-price PPS up to 2020: the growth rate of real 
GDP per capita as it is projected by the European Commission May 2017 forecast for 
2016-18 and the IMF April 2017 forecast for 2019-20. 
 Output gap: we use the European Commission May 2017 forecast for 2016-18 and 
then estimate a simple autoregression to project the output gap for 2019-20 (because 
IMF forecast is not available for the output gap). 
 Population: we approximate with the growth rate of population as it is projected by 
the European Commission May 2017 forecast for 2016-18 and the IMF April 2017 
forecast for 2019-20. 
Inserting the mean income and output gap projections to our estimated regression 
models we project the ‘not at risk of poverty’ rate up to 2020. Figure 5 shows that the 
projections look sensible for all countries except perhaps for Romania, where projected fall in 
the ‘not at risk of poverty’ rate might be too large.  
                                                        
14 For Finland, Hungary and Latvia 2016 data is also available. 
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Figure 5 
The ‘not at risk of poverty’ component of the ‘at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion’ indicator, 2003-20 (% of population) 
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Source: Eurostat for actual data (solid line), author calculations for projections (symbols). 
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Population projections allow translating the rate projections into number of people 
projections: in the EU27, 6.2 million people with income over the 60 percent of national 
median equivalised income are projected to be lifted from material deprivation and/or living 
in low work intensity households between 2015-20. 
Given this projection for the ‘not at risk of poverty’ component of the ‘at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion’ indicator and considering population projections, we illustratively calculate 
that the at-risk-of-poverty component should be reduced by 15.5 million between 2015 and 
2020 in order to achieve the Europe 2020 target (see Table 4). This is equivalent to a 3.3 
points decline in the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate in each EU country. Therefore, our calculation for 
the at-risk-of-poverty component is not a projection, just an illustration. 
Figure 6 
 Illustrative scenario showing the necessary reduction in the ‘at risk of poverty’ 
rate and the Gini coefficient of income inequality to meet the Europe 2020 
‘poverty’ target in the EU27, 2006-2020 
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Source: Eurostat for 2006-15; author calculations for 2016-20. Note: 
unweighted average of data of the first 27 EU member states. 
 
Given the strong association between the at-risk-of-poverty rate and the Gini coefficient 
of income inequality, we translate the necessary reduction in the at-risk-of-poverty rate to a 
necessary reduction in the Gini coefficient of income inequality in each EU country using the 
empirical association revealed by Figure 3. We find that the a 3.5 points decline in the Gini 
coefficient of income inequality would be consistent with reaching the Europe 2020 ‘poverty’ 
target (Figure 6). 
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Given relatively small historical variations in the Gini coefficient and a lack of strong 
policies to reduce income inequality, it is extremely unlikely that income inequality would fall 
to the level that would make the achievement of the Europe 2020 ‘poverty’ target realistic. 
5. EU-WIDE POVERTY INDICATORS 
5.1 EUROSTAT AGGREGATION OF COUNTRY DATA TO THE EU-LEVEL 
Beyond the inherent difficulties of national ‘at risk of poverty’ rates, the differences between 
the national thresholds (which are used to calculate the ‘at risk of poverty rate’ in each 
country) are so huge that they further underline the inappropriateness of this indicator for 
assessing poverty trends. The question can also be asked of whether adding up the number of 
such people in different countries to arrive at an EU-wide number makes sense. 
In Romania, for example, after correcting for differences in price levels, a disposable 
income of €2,613 a year (after taxes and social transfers) is considered to be the threshold in 
2015, while in Luxembourg the price-level adjusted threshold is €17,571. Therefore, someone 
with an income slightly below the national threshold in Luxembourg is regarded as ‘at risk of 
poverty’, when she or he can consume seven times more goods and services than someone in 
Romania slightly above the national threshold and therefore not ‘at risk of poverty’. 
The difference between two less-divergent countries, Austria and the Czech Republic, is 
also substantial: after taking different national price levels into account, someone at the 
national threshold in Austria can consume twice as much in goods and services than someone 
at the national threshold in the Czech Republic. A two-fold difference is also huge: double 
income means that a person can live in a twice as large house, buy a twice as expensive car or 
spend twice as much on a holiday. Therefore, adding up the number of people ‘at risk of 
poverty’ in Luxembourg, Romania, Austria, Czech Republic and other EU countries leads to 
an EU-wide aggregate that is very difficult to interpret.  
It is disappointing that 60 years after the Treaty of Rome set European integration in 
motion, EU-wide income distribution statistics are still derived by simply adding up country-
specific data, instead of considering the distribution of income within the EU as a whole. To 
address this problem, we calculate poverty indicators for the EU as a whole. 
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5.2 DERIVING INCOME POVERTY INDICATORS FROM THE EU-WIDE DISTRIBUTION 
OF INCOME 
A large number of income poverty indicators have been proposed in the literature. Many 
require access to household-level data that we do not have. We therefore derive two 
indicators of poverty, which can be constructed using publicly-available data from Eurostat: 
 Headcount: share of people living on less than 2, 5, 10 or 20 euros a day (at constant 
2007 purchasing power standards). 
 Poverty gap: the total combined shortfall of income less than 2, 5, 10 or 20 euros a day 
(at constant 2007 purchasing power standards) as a share of GDP. This is obtained by 
adding up all the shortfalls of the poor, e.g. for all people with income less than 2 
euros a day, we add up the gaps between 2 euros and their actual income.  
As highlighted by Marx, Nolan and Olivera (2015), based on the seminal works of 
Amartya Sen, a headcount poverty target may provide a perverse incentive to policymakers to 
target those who are below but close to the poverty threshold (because those people can lifted 
over the poverty threshold in a much easier way than the very poor). A poverty gap target 
may provide incentives to consider all the poor, including those who are very poor15. 
Beyond calculating these indicators for each country, we calculate these indicators for the 
EU27 as a whole, for which we approximate the EU-wide distribution of income. The main 
steps of the calculations are the following: 
1. For each country, we approximate more detailed data on income distribution (i.e. all 
the 100 percentiles) than what is available (Eurostat publishes the following income 
shares data for each country: 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 percentiles, deciles, quartiles, 95, 96, 97, 
98, 99 and 100 percentiles). 
2. For each country, we use a measure of mean income to approximate the income of 
households corresponding to the 100 percentiles. 
3. Using population size, we combine approximated household incomes of each country 
to obtain the EU-wide distribution of income. 
For the first step, we use the Lorenz curve regression method16 of Bhalla (2002) and 
Kakwani (1980), which Darvas (2016) found to be the most reliable among three methods 
                                                        
15 There are also measures that focus even more on the very poor. For example, by adding up the 
squares of individual poverty gaps places a higher weight on those households that are further from 
the poverty line (see Coudouel et al, 2002). 
16 Bhalla (2002) calls this regression method the ‘Simple Accounting Procedure’ (SAP), yet we find 
the name ‘Lorenz-curve regression method’ more accurate. 
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which are based on quantile income shares data. This method adopts a regression to 
approximate the Lorenz-curve in each country based on the limited number of quantile 
income share data available. The estimated regression proposed by Kakwani (1980) is the 
following: 
 
in which  represents the bottom i percent of the population,  is the corresponding 
share in income (i.e. the value of the Lorenz-curve at ), while  and  are parameters 
to be estimated and  is the error term. The estimated regression is used to project the 
Lorenz-curve at the 100 percentiles of the income distribution for each country. 
In the second step, we use mean income at purchasing power standards (PPS), adjusted 
by the EU28 consumer prices. Eurostat published PPS data at current prices, which is 
comparable across countries in a given year, but not comparable in time. We wish to fix the 
thresholds at their 2007 real values, which is the first year for which income distribution data 
is available for the first 27 EU member states. Therefore, for later years, we increase the 2007 
poverty threshold values (i.e. 2, 5, 10 and 20 euros a day) by the EU28 harmonised index of 
consumer prices. We then compare these current-price equivalents of the poverty thresholds 
at ‘2007 price PPS’ to current-price PPS income data. 
And in the third step we use population size to combine the national income distributions 
into the EU27 distribution of income.  
We note that our Bhalla-Kakwani regression approximations can be a source of 
measurement error. Unfortunately, income share data published by Eurostat is rounded to 
one digit after the decimal. At very low levels of income such rounding prohibits to get 
sufficient information about income shares. Therefore, we recommend Eurostat to revise its 
publication policy and report at least two significant digits, instead of rounding to one digit 
after the decimal, when publishing income shares data and other indicators with values close 
to zero. 
As an example for insufficient information due to rounding, Table 6 shows the income 
shares of the lowest five percentiles of Belgium in 2011 as published by Eurostat and as 
approximated by our regression: 
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Table 6 
 Income shares of the lowest five percentiles, Belgium, 2011 
 
Data published 
by Eurostat 
Approximated by 
our regression 
First percentile 0.0 0.036 
Second percentile 0.3 0.238 
Third percentile 0.3 0.306 
Fourth percentile 0.4 0.350 
Fifth percentile 0.4 0.383 
Source: Eurostat (first data column), author calculations (second data column). 
 
For the first percentile Eurostat provides the number zero (after rounding), while 
presumably the true value is not exactly zero. Our regression approximates this share as 
0.036 percent, which is 0.0 after rounding. For the second and third percentiles Eurostat 
provides 0.3 percent (again, after rounding), while by definition the income share of the third 
percentile must be higher than that of the second percentile. The fourth and fifth percentiles 
also seem to have identical income shares according to the rounded data. In this particular 
case of Belgium’s 2011 data, four of our approximations of the lowest five percentiles income 
shares correspond to Eurostat data after rounding, while our approximation for the second 
percentile does not correspond.  
Therefore, our approximation for each country is burdened with a measurement error, 
which can be larger when the poverty threshold is close to the very bottom of the income 
distribution. Likely, the measurement error is smaller when the threshold is not too close to 
the bottom of the income distribution, given that more information is available to 
approximate those incomes. And for the EU as whole, the measurement error is likely smaller 
than for individual countries also for low income threshold levels, given the large income 
differences across countries. For example, very few people, if any, is at the bottom one 
percent of the EU-wide income distribution from Luxembourg, while six percent of 
Romanian citizens belong there, whose income is already measured with a reasonable degree 
of precision. 
According to our calculations, less than one percent of EU citizens live on less than 2 
euros a day (at 2007 PPS; Figure 7). The shares of people living on less than 5, 10 and 20 
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such euros are about 2 percent, 6 percent and 19 percent, respectively. The 2015 shares are all 
below the 2007 shares, yet there was a temporary increase in the early 2010s. The poverty 
gap indicator suggests that the combined income shortfall of people living on less than 2 or 5 
PPS euro is very small as a share of EU27 GDP, while the poverty gap for 10 PPS euro is about 
0.4 percent of EU27 GDP, and the poverty gap at 20 PPS euro is about 2.1 percent of EU GDP 
in 2015. The dynamics of poverty gap is similar to the dynamics of the head count, but, for 
example, in the case of the 5 euro threshold, the headcount fell more than the poverty gap 
between 2007-15, while for the 20 euro threshold the opposite result holds.  
Figure 7 
 Poverty indicators derived from the EU27 distribution of income 
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Source: author calculations. Note: the poverty thresholds are measured at 2007 
constant-price purchasing power standards. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PROPOSALS FOR ADEQUATE POVERTY 
MEASUREMENT  
Increasing awareness about the EU’s social problems and finding solutions to these problems 
are crucial tasks. The European Commission, the European Parliament and national leaders 
deserve praise for focusing more and more on the social aspects of the European Union and 
for working towards certain social targets in the context of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
However, there is great confusion arising from the incorrect labelling of the key social 
target indicator, the ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ rate, which stands at about 24 
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percent of the total EU population. This indicator, and variants of it such as the indicators 
applied to children, women or working age people, is widely understood a measure of 
‘poverty’ or ‘social exclusion’, whereas it is actually an indicator of income inequality, as we 
demonstrate both theoretically and empirically in this paper. The EU faces a number of social 
challenges, including poverty and social exclusion among certain segments of the society, but 
it is not correct that 24 percent of EU citizens face a high risk of poverty or social exclusion, 
as the name of this indicator would suggest. This relatively high rate is mostly the reflection 
of the level of income inequality in EU countries, which, measured by the Gini coefficient, is 
about 30 on average. The multidimensional poverty indicators of Weziak-Bialowolska (2016) 
suggest that poverty in EU countries varies from less than one percent in Denmark and 
Sweden to about 15 percent in Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania, with an EU-wide average of 4.3 
percent, well below the values of the ‘at risk of poverty’ and the ‘at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion’ indicators.  
Our illustrative calculations show that a very big fall in income inequality, 3.5 Gini points, 
would be consistent with reaching the Europe 2020 ‘poverty’ target, even after taking into 
account the expected reduction in material deprivation and low work intensity because of 
expected economic growth in the coming years. Such a large reduction in income inequality is 
improbable given the historical variations in income inequality and the lack of strong policies 
to reduce income inequality. Therefore, it should not be surprising that ‘poverty’ targets 
based on the variants of the ‘at risk of poverty’ indicators were not met in the past and will 
not be met in the future.  
The political agreement about the Europe 2020 strategy refers to poverty and not to 
income inequality. It is a grave mistake to base the Europe 2020 poverty target on an 
indicator of income inequality and to speak about ‘poverty reduction’ in relation to that 
indicator. There are good reasons to aim for lower income inequality, not least to foster 
upward social mobility, as argued by Darvas and Wolff (2016). But for that to happen an EU-
wide political agreement would be needed to set an income inequality goal and the toolkit 
would have to be adjusted to target income inequality reductions. 
As for the social indicators used in the context of the Europe 2020 strategy, we 
recommend that the misleading indicator name ‘at risk of poverty’ should be replaced with 
‘relative income poverty or income inequality’, to dispel any doubts about the correct 
interpretation of the indicator. Similarly, the indicator name ‘at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion’ should be replaced with ‘relative income poverty or income inequality or 
potentially social excluded’, which may sound convoluted, but would be better than then the 
current short but misleading name. However, because of the difficultly in interpreting this 
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indicator, it would be better to scrap it and design new ones, which might refer either to 
absolute poverty or relative poverty and income inequality, depending on political choices. 
We propose the development of new social indicators. For example, Marx, Nolan and 
Olivera (2015) highlight that research to establish better poverty thresholds than 60 percent 
of the median income, such as the cost of a specific basket of goods and services, has had a 
quite limited impact on policy formulation. Coudouel, Hentschel and Wodon (2002) also 
provide many useful guidelines for the development of new indicators, some of which also 
consider the depth and severity of poverty. And in the EU context, EU-wide indicators should 
consider the distribution of income within the EU as a whole. 
We also recommend that Eurostat should revise its data publication policy and report at 
least two significant digits, instead of rounding to one digit after the decimal, when 
publishing income share data and other indicators with values close to zero. 
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ANNEX: DATA SOURCES 
Data used in Section 1: 
 The number of people ‘at risk of poverty’ in the first 15 members of the EU in 2000, 
2007 and 2010: we multiply the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate with population. Sources: the 
‘at risk of poverty’ rate in 2000, 2007 and 2010 is from the Eurostat dataset ‘At-risk-
of-poverty rate by poverty threshold, age and sex - EU-SILC survey [ilc_li02]’ (for 
Sweden and Denmark the 2000 data is missing, but the 1999 and 2001 data is 
available, so we use the average of these two data points); population is from the 
European Commission’s AMECo dataset (May 2017 version). 
 The number of people ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ in the first 27 members of 
the EU in 2008, 2012 and 2015: Eurostat dataset ‘People at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion by age and sex [ilc_peps01]’. 
Data used in Section 2.1:  
 Eurostat dataset ‘Intersections of Europe 2020 Poverty Target Indicators by age and 
sex [ilc_pees01]’. 
Data used in Section 3.2: 
 ‘At risk of poverty rate (cut-off point: 60 percent of median equivalised income after 
social transfers)’: Eurostat dataset ‘At-risk-of-poverty rate by poverty threshold, age 
and sex - EU-SILC survey [ilc_li02]’. 
 Gini coefficient is the ‘Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income’: Eurostat 
dataset ‘Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income - EU-SILC survey 
[ilc_di12]’. 
 Severe material deprivation rate: Eurostat dataset ‘Severe material deprivation rate by 
age and sex [ilc_mddd11]’. 
Data used in Section 4.1: 
 ‘At risk of poverty rate (cut-off point: 60 percent of median equivalised income after 
social transfers)’: same as in section 3.2. 
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 ‘At risk of poverty or social exclusion’ rate: Eurostat dataset ‘People at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion by age and sex [ilc_peps01]’. 
 Mean equivalised net income at constant price purchasing power standards: Eurostat 
publishes data at current-price purchasing power standards (PPS) in its dataset ‘Mean 
and median income by age and sex - EU-SILC survey [ilc_di03]’, which is comparable 
across countries in a given year, but not across time. In order to approximate mean 
income at constant-price PPS, we deflate current-price PPS data with the EU28 
harmonised index of consumer prices using the Eurostat dataset ‘HICP (2015 = 100) - 
annual data (average index and rate of change) [prc_hicp_aind]’. 
 Output gap: ‘Gap between actual and potential gross domestic product at 2010 
reference levels (Percentage of potential gross domestic product at constant prices)’ 
from the European Commission’s AMECO dataset (May 2017 version). 
Data on projections used in Section 4.2: 
 Mean income growth rate in constant-price PPS up to 2020: the growth rate of real 
GDP per capita as it is projected by the European Commission May 2017 forecast for 
2016-18 and the IMF April 2017 World Economic Outlook forecast for 2019-20. 
 Output gap: we use the European Commission May 2017 forecast for 2016-18 and 
then estimate a simple autoregression to project the output gap for 2019-20 (because 
IMF forecast is not available for the output gap). 
 Population: we approximate with the growth rate of population as it is projected by 
the European Commission May 2017 forecast for 2016-18 and the IMF April 2017 
World Economic Outlook forecast for 2019-20. 
Data used in Section 5.1:  
 Eurostat dataset ‘At-risk-of-poverty thresholds - EU-SILC survey [ilc_li01]’, Single 
person, At risk of poverty threshold (60% of median equivalised income), Purchasing 
Power Standard. 
Data used in Section 5.2:  
 Income shares: Eurostat dataset ‘Distribution of income by quantiles - EU-SILC 
survey [ilc_di01]’. 
 Mean equivalised net income: same as in Section 4.1. 
 Population: same as in Section 1. 
